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Abstract  
This study considers a (partially privatized) semi-public firm in a mixed duopoly and examines the 
welfare effects of discriminatory output subsidies under R&D competition. We find that the government 
grants higher subsidies to the private firm than to the semi-public firm, which induces the private firm 
to invest more in R&D and to produce a higher output than the semi-public firm. We also show that 
optimal subsidy rates are higher (lower) than uniform subsidy rates for a sufficiently high (low) degree 
of privatization, which could decrease (increase) social welfare. This finding sharply contrasts to the 
case that the committed discriminatory output subsidy always yields the highest welfare compared to 
non-committed cases. 
Keywords: mixed ownership; time-consistency; discriminatory output subsidies; R&D competition 
1. Introduction 
Many industries are composed of mixed ownership in developed and developing countries,1 and semi-
public firms (partially privatized) are highly concentrated within a few sectors with large portions of the 
world’s resources. For example, the Chinese government has steadily advanced mixed-ownership 
reform of state-owned enterprises, which resulted in the number of mixed-owned firms under 
government control totalling approximately 69% in 2017, while intensively competing with privately-
owned firms in certain sectors such as transportation, energy, finance, education, and healthcare.  
 
1 Kowalski et al. (2013, OECD) reported that among the 2,000 largest public companies in the world, more than 
10% are (semi-) public and state owned and more than half (in terms of value) of all public firms in OECD 
countries are significant players in energy-related industries. For some real examples, see Ino and Matsumura 
(2010), Lee et al. (2018), Xu and Lee (2019), and Liu and Wang (2020). 
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Many researchers have addressed mixed oligopolies that have been initially defined by De Fraja and 
Delbono (1989) as the simultaneous presence of private and public firms in a competitive market. 
Matsumura (1998) introduced the analysis of mixed ownership to the mixed duopoly market in which 
the government determines the optimal privatization policy of the partially privatized public firm, rather 
than of fully public or fully private firms. Ever since, recent theoretical literature in the context of applied 
game theory and industrial economics has focused on the effects of mixed ownership on semi-public 
firm strategies and social welfare.2 
Recently, as globalisation and technological improvement have intensified market competition among 
innovative firms, governments have not only reformed mixed ownership, but significantly enacted 
various policies to encourage R&D activities. For example, numerous governments in both developed 
and developing countries offer substantial subsidies or tax credits to firms, to remedy firm-level 
distortions and for financial resource accessibility to reflect across firm resource reallocation.3  
Accordingly, some studies examined innovation activities and R&D policies in mixed oligopoly 
markets.4 Regarding cost-reducing innovation, Gil-Molto et al. (2011, 2020) and Lee and Muminov 
(2020) investigated the welfare effects of R&D subsidies and privatization policies, while Kasevayuth 
and Zikos (2013), Lee et al. (2017), Haruna and Goel (2017), and Atallah (2019) compared the relative 
superiority between R&D subsidies and output subsidies. They found that R&D subsidies are more 
socially beneficial when R&D spillovers are high, whereas output subsidies are superior when R&D 
spillovers are low. Chen et al. (2014), Gelves and Heywood (2016), and Kim et al. (2018) also discussed 
strategic licensing technology of innovative products in a mixed oligopoly.  
 
2 Many previous studies examined various topics of mixed oligopolies, such as endogenous timing, product 
differentiation, free entry competition, foreign penetration, excess burden of taxation, capacity constraints, output 
subsidy and environmental policies, and so forth. For more detailed descriptions in recent research, see Lee et al. 
(2013, 2017), Xu et al. (2016b), Lee and Xu (2018), and Kim et al. (2019). 
3 In OECD countries, governments finance between 8–10% of R&D spending by firms (García-Quevedo, 2004). 
Studwell (2013) shows that subsidies, along with other policies, played an important role in the economic 
development of Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, and China.  
4  For example, Delbono and Denicolo (1993), Poyago-Theotoky (1998), Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006), 
Heywood and Ye (2009), and Nie and Yang (2020) examined R&D activities in a mixed market, however, they did 
not include the analysis of subsidies or the implications of R&D policies.  
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In practical policies, while governments decide to subsidise R&D directly, there is some debate on the 
effectiveness (Kauko, 1996; Rebolledo and Sandonis, 2012). For example, governments might choose 
to subsidise output rather than R&D either when output enhancement is politically more popular among 
consumers or when the design and administration of R&D subsidies is relatively more complicated 
compared to output subsidies. Then, output subsidies can indirectly reduce the production costs of 
subsidised firms and enhance social welfare through resource redistribution 
From a theoretical viewpoint, several studies examined policy interaction between output subsidies and 
privatization in mixed oligopolies. White (1996) first showed that welfare is equal irrespective of the 
privatization policy, if government grants appropriate optimal output subsidies to firms. That is, the so-
called privatization neutrality theorem (PNT) states that welfare neutrality existed before and after 
privatization. Since then, numerous articles have analysed whether this theorem holds in various 
generalised situations.5 However, Fjell and Heywood (2004) and Lee and Xu (2018) considered a 
sequential-move situation in which a public firm acts as a leader after privatization and showed that 
privatization neutrality failed. That is, firm asymmetry among public and private firms does not result 
in welfare neutrality.6  
On the other hand, existing literature has only examined a uniform output subsidy to public and private 
firms in a mixed oligopoly market. One exception is Hamada (2016, 2017), who recognized firm 
heterogeneity and demonstrated that even if cost differences (or objective differences) exists between 
firms and if the public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader before and after privatization, privatization 
neutrality is satisfied and welfare is maximized under discriminatory output subsidies. Further, if 
government can credibly commit to a discriminatory subsidy rate from the introduction stage of an 
 
5 In detail, the PNT states that privatization does not affect welfare, regardless of time structure, competition mode, 
the number of firms, product differentiation, and the degree of privatization under the optimal output subsidy. 
Academic debates have been discussed continuously by Pal and White (1998), Poyago-Theotoky (2001), Tomaru 
and Saito (2010), Matsumura and Ogawa (2012), Matsumura and Okumura (2013, 2017), and Lin and Matsumura 
(2018).  
6 It is also known that the PNT failed under policy considerations of other asymmetric factors such as foreign 
competitors (Matsumura and Tomaru, 2012), excess burden of taxation (Matsumura and Tomaru, 2013), free entry 
(Matsumura and Okumura, 2017), and R&D competition (Lee and Tomaru, 2017; Lee et al, 2017). 
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output subsidy policy, it poses significant implications for supporting superior welfare properties 
associated with a committed subsidy policy. Therefore, the discriminatory output subsidy always yields 
the highest welfare compared to the uniform output subsidy, irrespective of the degree of privatization. 
In this study, however, we consider a time-consistent output subsidy framework7 and highlight the 
interaction between a discriminatory output subsidy policy with ex-ante innovation incentives of the 
firms. We examine the impact of mixed ownership on the semi-public firm’s activities8 and show that 
strategic incentive for innovation among firms do not necessarily result in welfare improvement.  
Our main findings are as follows: We show that the government grants a higher subsidy to the private 
firm than the public firm, resulting in the private firm investing more in R&D and producing a higher 
output, regardless of the degree of privatization. In the case in which both firms invest in R&D before 
the government determines the subsidy rate, the private firm intentionally and strategically invests 
aggressively in R&D to earn a higher subsidy, which also increases the firm’s output and profit. Since 
R&D investments are strategic substitutes irrespective of the degree of privatization, when the private 
firm increases R&D and output, the semi-public firm reduces R&D and output. Subsequently, a 
discriminatory output subsidy redistributes output from the public firm with high marginal costs to the 
private firm with low marginal costs. Hence, the government grants a lower output subsidy to the public 
firm than the private firm, while the difference decreases as the degree of privatization increases.  
We also compare with the uniform output subsidy and show that optimal discriminatory subsidy rates 
are higher (lower) than those of uniform subsidy rates for a sufficiently high (low) degree of privatization, 
which results in a decrease (increase) of social welfare.  
 
7 Some research examined the time-consistent tax framework in which the regulator is not able to commit to 
emission tax and showed that firms undertake increased abatement activities that generate less pollution, which 
could result in improved welfare. See, for example, Poyago-Theotoky and Teerasuwannajak (2002), Moner-
Colonques and Rubio (2015), Leal et al. (2018), Garcia et al. (2018), and Chen et al. (2019). For discussions on 
the practical evidence of the commitment issue in mixed economies, see Lee et al. (2018) and Ino and Miyaoka 
(2020). 
8 In the discussion section, we examine a committed regime in which the government can commit a discriminatory 
output subsidy before firms choose R&D investments and show that the PNT still holds. 
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On the one hand, if the degree of privatization is sufficiently high, the semi-public firm’s social concern 
is weak with a much stronger profit incentive, which induces overinvestment between firms as well as 
welfare loss. However, once the firms choose R&D investments, the distribution of production costs 
across firms is more symmetric and efficient, and thus, the government grants higher output subsidies 
to both firms to increase total industry output. That is, although a high degree of privatization can 
eliminate cost inefficiency, underproduction distortion is serious. By expecting this regulatory flexibility 
under discriminatory output subsidies, the private firm has stronger incentive to invest more in R&D, 
which results in overinvestment in total R&D and induces larger welfare loss than under the uniform 
output subsidy.  
On the other hand, if the degree of privatization is sufficiently low, social concern of the semi-public 
firm is much stronger, which reduces overinvestment between the firms, compared to a higher degree 
of privatization. Due to the larger asymmetry between the firms, the distribution of production costs 
across the firms is inefficient, however, the semi-public firm can produce more output to increase total 
industry output. That is, although a low degree of privatization can increase cost inefficiency, 
underproduction distortion is less serious. Subsequently, the government grants lower output subsidies 
to both firms under discriminatory output subsidies and the private firm is less inclined to invest more 
in R&D. As a result, it reduces overinvestment in total R&D and induces higher welfare than under the 
uniform output subsidy. This result sharply contrasts to the case of committed output subsidy in which 
the PNT holds. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we provides a cost-reducing innovation 
model of mixed duopoly with a (semi-) public and private firm. We analyse the discriminatory output 
subsidy in Section 3 and compare it with uniform output subsidy in Section 4. We also compare the 
committed discriminatory output subsidy in Section 5. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 6. 
2. The Model 
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We consider a duopoly market which produces homogeneous goods. The inverse demand function is 𝑃(𝑄) = 𝑎 − 𝑄, where 𝑃 is market price, 𝑄(= 𝑞0 + 𝑞1) is market output, and 𝑞𝑖 is the output of firm 𝑖 = 0,1, respectively. Then, consumer surplus is CS = 𝑄2/2. 
As assumed in Zikos (2007), Gil-Molto et al. (2011), and Lee et al. (2017), we consider a quadratic cost 
function of output production where marginal costs increase with respect to output: 9  𝐶(𝑞𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) =(𝑐 − 𝑥𝑖)𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞𝑖2, where 𝑐 is the initial cost level with 𝑎 > 𝑐 > 0 and 𝑥𝑖 denotes the amount of R&D 
investment required for firm i to reduce the cost level. Note that a firm’s R&D shifts the marginal cost 
function downwards, 𝜕𝐶/𝜕𝑞𝑖 = 𝑐 − 𝑥𝑖+2𝑞𝑖, but does not alter the slope. In addition, R&D is perfectly 
protected against imitation.10 We also assume that the firm has to spend 𝑥𝑖2 to implement cost-reducing 
R&D, 𝑥𝑖, which exhibits decreasing returns to scale. Subsequently, the R&D cost function is given as 𝛤(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥𝑖2 where 𝑖 = 0,1. 
We consider that each firm receives an output subsidy, 𝑠𝑖𝑞𝑖, where  𝑠𝑖  denotes the per-unit 
(discriminatory) subsidy to output quantity, 𝑞𝑖. Then, the profit function of the firm and social welfare, 
defined as the sum of consumer surplus, industry profits, and net subsidy, are as follows: 
𝜋𝑖 = (𝑎 − 𝑞0 − 𝑞1)𝑞𝑖 − (𝑐 − 𝑥𝑖)𝑞𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖2 − 𝑥𝑖2 + 𝑠𝑖  𝑞𝑖,                                                           (1) 
𝑊 = 𝐶𝑆 + 𝜋0 + 𝜋1 − 𝑠0 𝑞0 − 𝑠1𝑞1.                                                                                             (2) 
In general, we assume that subsidies are financed by taxpayers in the form of lump-sum payments, to 
avoid influencing welfare directly and to be cancelled out when aggregated. 
We also assume that firm 1 is a private firm that maximizes profit while firm 0 is a (partially privatized) 
public firm. That is, we allow the government to sell shares of firm 0 to private investors who are seeking 
profit maximization. As a result, firm 0 is under mixed ownership of government control and jointly 
 
9 This assumption is necessary in the analysis of mixed markets for ruling out the uninteresting case of a public 
monopoly. 
10 We ignore the effects of R&D spillovers between the firms even though a part or all R&D outcomes of a firm 
might spill over to a rival firm in the same market. See Heywood and Ye (2009), Gil-Moltó et al. (2011), 
Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013), Haruna and Goel (2017), and Lee and Muminov (2020). In this case, Kasevayuth 
and Zikos (2013) showed that the output subsidy is more socially beneficial than the R&D subsidy. 
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owned by the government and private investors. Following Matsumura (1998), let 𝜃 ∈ [0,1) refer to the 
shares of firm 0 held by private investors, while firm 0 maximizes the convex combination of profit and 
welfare:11 
𝑉 = (1 − 𝜃)𝑊 + 𝜃𝜋0.                                                                                                                      (3) 
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, both firms decide to invest in R&D 
simultaneously. In the second stage, the government sets time-consistent discriminatory output subsidies, 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑖 = 0,1, after observing both firms’ decisions about R&D. In the last stage, firms compete in 
quantities in a Cournot fashion. We solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by backward induction. 
3. The Analysis 
In the third stage of output choice, the first-order conditions provide the following equilibrium output: 
𝑞0(𝑥0, 𝑥1, 𝑠0, 𝑠1) = 3(𝑎 − 𝑐) + 4𝑥0 − 𝑥1 + 4𝜃𝑠0 − 𝑠111 + 4𝜃 , 
𝑞1(𝑥0, 𝑥1, 𝑠0, 𝑠1) = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(2 + 𝜃) − 𝑥0 + (3 + 𝜃)(𝑥1 + 𝑠1) − 𝜃𝑠011 + 4𝜃 , 
𝑄(𝑥0, 𝑥1, 𝑠0, 𝑠1) = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(5 + 𝜃) + 3𝑥0 + 3𝜃𝑠0 + (2 + 𝜃)(𝑥1 + 𝑠1)11 + 4𝜃 .                               (4) 
This shows that an increase in R&D increases the output of the firms, but the increasing rate of a public 
firm is higher than a private firm, i.e., 
𝜕𝑞0(𝑥0,𝑥1,𝑠0,𝑠1)𝜕𝑥0 > 𝜕𝑞1(𝑥0,𝑥1,𝑠0,𝑠1)𝜕𝑥1 > 0. However, the firm’s R&D 
decreases the output of the rival firm, i.e., 
𝜕𝑞1(𝑥0,𝑥1,𝑠0,𝑠1)𝜕𝑥0 = 𝜕𝑞0(𝑥0,𝑥1,𝑠0,𝑠1)𝜕𝑥1 < 0.  In sum, an R&D 
investment will increase total industry output. It also shows that the output subsidy increases the output 
of the firm, but the increasing rate of the private firm is higher than that of the public firm, 
 
11 Studies on partial privatization are gaining increasing popularity and are used extensively in various contexts 
since Matsumura (1998). For example, Ino and Matsumura (2010), Lee et al. (2013), and Xu et al. (2016a) 
reviewed several research topics on partial privatization. 
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i.e., 𝜕𝑞1(𝑥0,𝑥1,𝑠0,𝑠1)𝜕𝑠1 > 𝜕𝑞0(𝑥0,𝑥1,𝑠0,𝑠1)𝜕𝑠0 > 0. However, the output subsidy of a firm decreases the output of 
the rival firm, i.e., 
𝜕𝑞0(𝑥0,𝑥1,𝑠0,𝑠1)𝜕𝑠1 ≤ 𝜕𝑞1(𝑥0,𝑥1,𝑠0,𝑠1)𝜕𝑠0 < 0, where the equality holds only if 𝜃 = 1. Note that 
the output subsidy of the public firm has no effect on the output of either of the firms if the public firm 
is fully nationalised, that is, 𝜃 = 0. Therefore, the output subsidy is insignificant with regards to welfare 
in the presence of a nationalised public firm. 
In the second stage, the government determines the welfare-maximizing output subsidy rate, by 
considering the firm’s R&D investment. The first order condition yields the following optimal output 
subsidies: 
𝑠0𝐷(𝑥0, 𝑥1) = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐) + 3𝑥0 − 𝑥18           and          𝑠1𝐷(𝑥0, 𝑥1) = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐) − 𝑥0 + 3𝑥18 .           (5) 
where the superscript D denotes the equilibrium under the discriminatory output subsidy. This shows 
that the output subsidy increases in the firm’s R&D, i.e., 𝜕𝑠𝑖𝐷(𝑥0,𝑥1)𝜕𝑥𝑖 > 0, while it decreases in the rival 
firm’s R&D, i.e., 𝜕𝑠𝑖𝐷(𝑥0,𝑥1)𝜕𝑥𝑗 < 0. Note that given R&D investments, the optimal output subsidy is 
independent of the degree of privatization. Therefore, without considering R&D investments, the well-
known PNT in literature on mixed markets is supported, which states that the optimal output subsidy 
rate yields similar welfare consequences before and after privatization. However, the PNT does not hold 
once the R&D setting stage is introduced, since the degree of privatization affects the equilibrium R&D 
investments, as shown below.  
In the first stage of R&D investment, the first-order conditions present the following reaction functions: 
𝑥0(𝑥1) = (2 + 𝜃)(2(𝑎 − 𝑐) − 𝑥1)26 − 3𝜃            and          𝑥1(𝑥0) = 3(2(𝑎 − 𝑐) − 𝑥0)23 .                      (6) 
Then, R&D decisions are strategic substitutes where the slope of the reaction function of each firm is 
negative, but that of the public firm is higher than the private firm, i.e., 
𝜕𝑥1𝐷(𝑥0)𝜕𝑥0 < 𝜕𝑥0𝐷(𝑥1)𝜕𝑥1 < 0.  
Solving the reaction function yields the following equilibrium R&D investments: 
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𝑥0𝐷 = 5(𝑎 − 𝑐)(2 + 𝜃)74 − 9𝜃           and          𝑥1𝐷 = 3(𝑎 − 𝑐)(6 − 𝜃)74 − 9𝜃 .                                                    (7) 
We can show that 𝑥0𝐷 − 𝑥1𝐷 < 0  for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1) . Further, public (private) firm’s R&D increases 
(decreases) as the degree of privatization increases, i.e., 
𝜕𝑥0𝐷𝜕𝜃 > 0 > 𝜕𝑥1𝐷𝜕𝜃 . 
Lemma 1. 𝑥0𝐷 < 𝑥1𝐷 for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1).  
Accordingly, the private firm invests more in R&D than the public firm, regardless of the degree of 
privatization. 12  That is, the private firm aggressively invests in R&D under the discriminatory 
production subsidy policy, which can yield higher subsidies and output as per the below analysis. 
By substituting (7) with (5), we obtain the following optimal output subsidy rates: 
𝑠0𝐷 = 20(𝑎 − 𝑐)74 − 9𝜃           and          𝑠1𝐷 = 4(𝑎 − 𝑐)(6 − 𝜃)74 − 9𝜃 .                                                                (8) 
We confirm that 𝑠0𝐷−𝑠1𝐷 < 0 for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1). Note that output subsidy rates are always positive, but that 
to the public (private) firm increases according to the degree of privatization, i.e., 
𝜕𝑠0𝐷𝜕𝜃 > 0 > 𝜕𝑠1𝐷𝜕𝜃 . Thus, 
a higher degree of privatization can encourage the semi-public firm to invest more in R&D and output 
production.  
Proposition 1. 𝑠0𝐷 < 𝑠1𝐷 for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1). 
The government grants a higher subsidy to the private firm than the public firm under the discriminatory 
output subsidy policy. Since R&D investments are strategic substitutes irrespective of the degree of 
privatization, when the private firm increases R&D and output, the semi-public firm reduces R&D and 
output. Subsequently, the discriminatory output subsidy redistributes output from the public firm with 
higher marginal costs to the private firm with lower marginal costs. Hence, the government grants a 
 
12 Note that 𝑥0𝐷 = 𝑥1𝐷 and 𝑞0𝐷 = 𝑞1𝐷 when 𝜃 = 1. 
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lower output subsidy to the public firm than the private firm, while the difference decreases as the degree 
of privatization increases. 
The equilibrium outputs are as follows: 
𝑞0𝐷 = 20(𝑎 − 𝑐)74 − 9𝜃              and          𝑞1𝐷 = 4(𝑎 − 𝑐)(6 − 𝜃)74 − 9𝜃                                                              (9) 
We demonstrate that 𝑞0𝐷 − 𝑞1𝐷 < 0 for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1). Note that the public (private) firm’s output is always 
positive and increases (decreases) in the degree of privatization, that is, 
𝜕𝑞0𝐷𝜕𝜃 > 0 > 𝜕𝑞1𝐷𝜕𝜃 . 
Lemma 2. 𝑞0𝐷 < 𝑞1𝐷 for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1). 
This states that the private firm invests more in R&D and produces more output than the public firm, 
regardless of the degree of privatization.  
Finally, we obtain the resulting profit of the private firm and social welfare as follows: 
𝜋1𝐷 = 23(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(6 − 𝜃)2(74 − 9𝜃)2           and          𝑊𝐷 = 10(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(152 − 𝜃(36 + 𝜃))(74 − 9𝜃)2                (10) 
It shows that the profit of the private firm decreases in the degree of privatization, that is, 
𝜕𝜋1𝐷𝜕𝜃 < 0. This 
is because the (partially privatized) rival firm invests more in R&D and produces more output as the 
degree of privatization increases. If the degree of privatization is sufficiently high, the profit incentive 
of the semi-public firm is stronger, which encourages investment by the semi-public firm. Then, the 
distribution of production costs across the firms is more symmetric and efficient while the firms produce 
a lower industry output. Hence, although a sufficiently high degree of privatization can remove cost 
inefficiency, underproduction has distorting effects on welfare. Contrarily, if the degree of privatization 
is sufficiently low, a high level of asymmetry exists between the firms, which results in inefficient 
distribution of production costs across the firms, while the semi-public firm can produce more output to 
increase total industry output. Consequently, although a sufficiently low degree of privatization can 
increase cost inefficiency, there is a welfare distortion of underproduction distortion. Therefore, social 
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welfare decreases (increases) when the degree of privatization is high (low), that is, 
𝜕𝑊𝐷𝜕𝜃 ><0 if 𝜃 <> 0.153. 
It implies that the optimal degree of privatization is 𝜃𝐷 = 0.153.  
Proposition 2. Mixed ownership with partial privatization policy is optimal under the discriminatory 
output subsidy policy. 
4. Comparisons with Uniform Output Subsidy 
In this section we examine the non-discriminatory uniform output subsidy when the degree of 
privatization is given exogenously, and then compare it with the discriminatory output subsidy in a time-
consistent regulatory framework. 
4.1 Non-discriminatory uniform output subsidy 
Under the uniform output subsidy, the equilibrium outcomes in the last stage are similar, except 𝑠0 =𝑠1 = 𝑠𝑞. Then, from (4) we can show the same result of R&D with the discriminatory output subsidy 
where the firm’s increase in R&D increases the output of the firms, but the increasing rate of the public 
firm is higher than that of the private firm. Note that even though cost-reducing R&D investment will 
increase total industry production, the uniform subsidy increases (decreases) the output of the public 
firm only when the degree of privatization is high (low). 
In the second stage of the welfare-maximizing output subsidy, the first order condition yields the 
following: 
𝑠𝑞𝑁(𝑥0, 𝑥1) = 6(𝑎 − 𝑐)(1 + 2𝜃2) − (3 + 4𝜃(1 − 4𝜃))𝑥0 + (9 + 4(1 − 𝜃)𝜃)𝑥124 + 48𝜃2 .                  (11) 
where the superscript N denotes the equilibrium under the non-discriminatory output subsidy. It shows 
that the output subsidy increases in the private firm’s R&D, i.e., 𝜕𝑠𝑞𝑁(𝑥0,𝑥1)𝜕𝑥1 > 0, but increases (decreases) 
the public firm’s R&D only if the degree of privatization is high (low), i.e., 𝜕𝑠𝑞𝑁(𝑥0,𝑥1)𝜕𝑥0 ><0 if 𝜃 >< 0.576. 
12 
 
Thus, the private firm has greater motivation to increase R&D, while the public firm’s decision depends 
on the degree of privatization. 
In the first stage of R&D investments, the first-order condition yields the following equilibrium R&D 
investments:  
𝑥0𝑁 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(360 + 81𝜃 + 2343𝜃2 + 516𝜃3 + 5076𝜃4 + 1376𝜃5 + 3584𝜃6 + 1280𝜃7)2664 + 351𝜃 + 17529𝜃2 + 1052𝜃3 + 38252𝜃4 − 224𝜃5 + 27776𝜃6 − 1792𝜃7 , 
𝑥1𝑁 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(3 + 4𝜃2)(216 + 27𝜃 + 909𝜃2 + 8𝜃3 + 992𝜃4 − 64𝜃5)2664 + 351𝜃 + 17529𝜃2 + 1052𝜃3 + 38252𝜃4 − 224𝜃5 + 27776𝜃6 − 1792𝜃7 . (12) 
We confirm that 𝑥0𝑁 − 𝑥1𝑁 = 96(1+2𝜃2)2(−3−𝜃2+4𝜃3)2664+351𝜃+17529𝜃2+1052𝜃3+38252𝜃4−224𝜃5+27776𝜃6−1792𝜃7 < 0  for 𝜃 ∈[0,1). It also shows that the private firm’s R&D decreases in the degree of privatization while that of 
the public firm increases, that is, 𝜕𝑥1𝑁𝜕𝜃 < 0 < 𝜕𝑥0𝑁𝜕𝜃 . The total R&D is non-monotone in the degree of 
privatization, that is, 
𝜕(𝑥0𝑁+𝑥1𝑁)𝜕𝜃 < 0 if 0.021 < 𝜃 < 0.840, while 𝜕(𝑥0𝑁+𝑥1𝑁)𝜕𝜃 > 0 otherwise.  
Lemma 3. 𝑥0𝑁 < 𝑥1𝑁 for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1). 
It states that the private firm invests more in R&D than the public firm, regardless of the degree of 
privatization. This is similar to the discriminatory output subsidy in which the private firm invests more 
aggressively in R&D under the output subsidy policy.13 
Substituting equation (12) with equation (11), we obtain the optimal production subsidy level as follows: 
𝑠𝑞𝑁 = 12(𝑎 − 𝑐)(1 + 2𝜃2)(72 + 13𝜃 + 287𝜃2 + 4𝜃3 + 320𝜃4)2664 + 351𝜃 + 17529𝜃2 + 1052𝜃3 + 38252𝜃4 − 224𝜃5 + 27776𝜃6 − 1792𝜃7 . (13) 
 
13  According to numerous theoretical studies, private firm investment in R&D is higher than the welfare-
maximizing level due to spillovers. For instance, Haruna and Goel (2017) and Lee and Muminov (2020) indicated 
a threshold of R&D spillovers, according to which the public firm produces less (more) output than the private 
firm with higher (lower) R&D spillovers. 
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Note that the output subsidy rate is positive but non-monotone in the degree of privatization, i.e., 
𝜕𝑠𝑁𝜕𝜃 <0 if 0.040 < 𝜃 < 0.961, while 𝜕𝑠𝑁𝜕𝜃 > 0 otherwise. From (4), the equilibrium output of both firms are 
obtained by: 
𝑞0𝑁 = 12(𝑎 − 𝑐)(1 + 2𝜃2)(60 + 13𝜃 + 283𝜃2 + 20𝜃3 + 320𝜃4)2664 + 351𝜃 + 17529𝜃2 + 1052𝜃3 + 38252𝜃4 − 224𝜃5 + 27776𝜃6 − 1792𝜃7, 
𝑞1𝑁 = 4(𝑎 − 𝑐)(1 + 2𝜃2)(216 + 27𝜃 + 909𝜃2 + 8𝜃3 + 992𝜃4 − 64𝜃5)2664 + 351𝜃 + 17529𝜃2 + 1052𝜃3 + 38252𝜃4 − 224𝜃5 + 27776𝜃6 − 1792𝜃7 . (14) 
We illustrate that 𝑞0𝑁 − 𝑞1𝑁 = 16(𝑎−𝑐)(−9+3𝜃−33𝜃2+19𝜃3−38𝜃4+42𝜃5−16𝜃6+32𝜃7)2664+351𝜃+17529𝜃2+1052𝜃3+38252𝜃4−224𝜃5+27776𝜃6−1792𝜃7 < 0  for 𝜃 ∈[0,1). It also shows that the private firm’s output decreases in the degree of privatization while that of 
the public firm increases, that is, 
𝜕𝑞1𝑁𝜕𝜃 < 0 < 𝜕𝑞0𝑁𝜕𝜃 . The total industry output is non-monotone in the 
degree of privatization, for instance, 
𝜕(𝑞0𝑁+𝑞1𝑁)𝜕𝜃 < 0 if 0.116 < 𝜃 < 0.883, but 𝜕(𝑞0𝑁+𝑞1𝑁)𝜕𝜃 > 0 otherwise. 
Lemma 4. 𝑞0𝑁 < 𝑞1𝑁 for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1). 
It states that the private firm produces more output than the public firm, regardless of the degree of 
privatization. This is similar to the discriminatory output subsidy in which the private firm more 
aggressively produces output under the output subsidy policy. 
The resulting profit of the private firm and social welfare is as follows: 
𝜋1𝑁 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)2(23 + 104𝜃2 + 112𝜃4)(216 + 27𝜃 + 909𝜃2 + 8𝜃3 + 992𝜃4 − 64𝜃5)2(2664 + 351𝜃 + 17529𝜃2 + 1052𝜃3 + 38252𝜃4 − 224𝜃5 + 27776𝜃6 − 1792𝜃7)2, 
𝑊𝑁 = { 
 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(984960 + 260496𝜃 + 13122351𝜃2 + 2537586𝜃3 +72367623𝜃4 + 8985120𝜃5 + 211711448𝜃6 + 12143008𝜃7 +346812272𝜃8 − 2339584𝜃9 + 301657344𝜃10 − 20496384𝜃11 +108486656𝜃12 − 13729792𝜃13 − 524288𝜃14) } 
 
{ 2664 + 351𝜃 + 17529𝜃2 + 1052𝜃3 +38252𝜃4 − 224𝜃5 + 27776𝜃6 − 1792𝜃7}2 .               (15) 
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Evidently, the profit of the private firm decreases in the degree of privatization, that is, 
𝜕𝜋1𝑁𝜕𝜃 < 0 while 
social welfare decreases (increases) if the degree of privatization is high (low), i.e., 
𝜕𝑊𝑁𝜕𝜃 ><0 if 𝜃 <>0.933. 
Finally, the optimal degree of privatization is 𝜃𝑁 = 0.933. Hence, mixed ownership with the partial 
privatization policy is optimal under the non-discriminatory output subsidy policy, but the degree is 
higher than that under the discriminatory output subsidy. 
Proposition 3. Mixed ownership with partial privatization policy is optimal under the uniform output 
subsidy policy. 
4.2. Comparison and discussion 
Proposition 4. 𝑠0𝐷  >< 𝑠𝑞𝑁 if 𝜃 >< 0.699 and 𝑠1𝐷 ><  𝑠𝑞𝑁 if 𝜃 >< 0.162.14 
This implies that the government is more flexible in granting output subsidies under discriminatory 
output subsidies, but that the rate depends on the degree of privatization. This is because the firm’s 
strategic profit incentive for making R&D decisions in a time-consistent framework in which the output 
subsidy rate is affected by the cost asymmetry between the firms, significantly depends on mixed 
ownership, that is, the degree of privatization. In particular, the discriminatory output subsidy rate is 
always higher (lower) than the uniform output subsidy for a sufficiently higher (lower) degree of 
privatization. That is, when the degree of privatization is high (low) where the semi-public firm is 
dominantly owned by private investors (government), the government can set a lower (higher) uniform 
subsidy rate. As a result, welfare could possibly be reduced by aiding a less efficient public firm under 
the discriminatory output subsidy. However, when the degree of privatization is intermediate, 𝑠0𝐷 <𝑠𝑞𝑁 < 𝑠1𝐷 if 0.162 < 𝜃 < 0.699. For instance, if the semi-public firm is almost equally owned by the 
government and private investors, the government will set an intermediate subsidy rate under the 
uniform output subsidy.  
 
14 The proofs of some propositions and lemmas are presented in the Appendix. 
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Lemma 5. Comparing discriminatory and uniform output subsidies, we obtain the following:  (𝑖)  𝑥0𝐷 > 𝑥0𝑁 for any 𝜃 ∈ [0,1); 𝑥1𝐷 ><𝑥1𝑁 if 𝜃 >< 0.037 and 𝑋𝐷 > 𝑋𝑁 for any 𝜃 ∈ [0.1) (𝑖𝑖)  𝑞0𝐷 > 𝑞0𝑁 for any 𝜃 ∈ [0,1); 𝑞1𝐷 >< 𝑞1𝑁 if 𝜃 ><0.108 and 𝑄𝐷 ><  𝑄𝑁 if 𝜃 ><0.028. (𝑖𝑖𝑖)  𝜋1𝐷 < 𝜋1𝑁 for any 𝜃 ∈ [0,1).  
Lemma 5 provides the effect of mixed ownership on the equilibrium outcomes under two different 
output subsidies. Lemma 5 (i) states that the public firm’s R&D and total industry R&D are always 
higher under the discriminatory output subsidy irrespective of the degree of privatization, while the 
private firm’s R&D depends on the degree of privatization. That is, the private firm increases (decreases) 
R&D as the degree of privatization increases (decrease) under the discriminatory output subsidy policy. 
Lemma 5 (ii), states that the output of the public firm always increases under the discriminatory output 
subsidy, while increasing a private firm’s output only in a higher degree of privatization. The total output 
remains higher in a greater degree of privatization under the discriminatory output subsidy policy. 
Lemma 5 (iii) states that the private firm’s profit always increases regardless of the degree of 
privatization under the uniform output subsidy.  
Proposition 5. 𝑊𝐷 ><𝑊𝑁 if 𝜃 <> 0.033. 
It reveals that in a time-consistent regulatory framework, the discriminatory output subsidy decreases 
social welfare only when the degree of privatization is not sufficiently low. This implies that when the 
government determines the output subsidy policy between discriminatory and uniform subsidy rates 
after observing the firms’ R&D decisions, it crucially depends on the decision of mixed ownership. In 
most cases, the government prefers the non-discriminatory output subsidy to the discriminatory output 
subsidy to reduce strategic welfare-distorting R&D decisions of the firms that initiate profit. However, 
the opposite is true for a sufficiently lower degree of privatization in which the welfare loss from 
strategic R&D can be minimized. Also, if the government chooses the optimal degree of privatization, 
as shown in Propositions 2 and 3, the welfare effect of the output subsidy presents the following 
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relationship: 𝑊𝐷(𝜃 = 0.153) < 𝑊𝑁(𝜃 = 0.933). Therefore, the discriminatory output subsidy could 
distort welfare under the optimal privatization policy.  
Economic explanations of the findings are as follows: the optimal subsidy rates for both firms are higher 
(lower) than those of the uniform subsidy rate for a high (low) degree of privatization, which results in 
a decrease (increase) of social welfare. On the one hand, if the degree of privatization is high, social 
concern of the semi-public firm is weak with a much stronger profit incentive. Subsequently, once the 
firms choose R&D investments, the distribution of production costs across the firms is more symmetric 
and efficient. Thus, the government can provide higher output subsidies for both firms to increase total 
industry output. That is, for a high degree of privatization, underproduction distortion from the private 
firms becomes more serious and is thus remedied by the higher uniform output subsidy.  
On the other hand, if the degree of privatization is sufficiently low, social concern of the semi-public 
firm is much stronger, which discourages overinvestment between the firms, compared to the higher 
degree of privatization. Due to the larger asymmetry between the firms, the distribution of production 
costs across the firms is inefficient, however, the semi-public firm can produce more output to increase 
total industry output. That is, although the (efficient) private firm receives an output subsidy for a low 
degree of privatization, so does the (inefficient) public firm under the uniform output subsidy. Therefore, 
welfare could decrease when less efficient firms are aided. Further, these uniform subsidies distort 
competition further according to the fact that firm's R&D choices occur before they are set. Thus, the 
firms’ strategic behaviour that influences subsidies, further reduces the welfare level compared to the 
discriminatory subsidy. In Section 5, we show that this result sharply contrasts the case of committed 
output subsidy in which the PNT holds and thus, the discriminatory output subsidy always yields the 
highest welfare compared to the uniform output subsidy, irrespective of the degree of privatization. 
5. Discussion 
We compare the committed output subsidy policy in which the government credibly commits to 
discriminatory output subsidies before the firms choose R&D decisions. The timing of this committed 
game between the R&D stage and subsidy stage is reversed: in the first stage, the government chooses 
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either the discriminatory or uniform output subsidy, whereas both firms choose their R&D investment 
levels in the second stage and their output levels in the third stage.  
In the third stage, output choice is similar to the non-committed output subsidy policy, in which the 
equilibrium output of firms are derived as per (4). In the second stage of R&D investments, the first-
order conditions provide the following equilibrium R&D investments: 
𝑥0𝐶(𝑠0, 𝑠1) = {(𝑎 − 𝑐) (275 + 𝜃(248 + 𝜃(65 + 4𝜃))) + 𝜃(429 + 𝜃(337 + 66𝜃))𝑠0−(3 + 𝜃)(17 + 𝜃(33 + 10𝜃))𝑠1 }1837 + 𝜃(2159 + 2𝜃(425 + 56𝜃)) , 
𝑥1𝐶(𝑠0, 𝑠1) = 2(3+𝜃)((𝑎−𝑐)(33+𝜃(33+8𝜃))−2𝜃(11+4𝜃)𝑠0+2(3+𝜃)(9+4𝜃)𝑠1)1837+𝜃(2159+2𝜃(425+56𝜃))                           (16) 
where the superscript C denotes the equilibrium under the committed discriminatory output subsidy. 
Then, we obtain the equilibrium output of the second stage: 
𝑞0𝐶(𝑠0, 𝑠1) = (11 + 4𝜃)((𝑎 − 𝑐)(53 + 21𝜃) + 4𝜃(19 + 7𝜃)𝑠0) − (215 + 𝜃(193 + 42𝜃))𝑠11837 + 𝜃(2159 + 2𝜃(425 + 56𝜃)) ,, 
𝑞1𝐶(𝑠0, 𝑠1) = (11+4𝜃)((𝑎−𝑐)(33+𝜃(33+8𝜃))−2𝜃(11+4𝜃)𝑠0+2(3+𝜃)(9+4𝜃)𝑠1)1837+𝜃(2159+2𝜃(425+56𝜃)) .                          (17) 
In the first stage, the government chooses the optimal output subsidy for maximizing social welfare as 
follows: 
𝑠0𝐶 = 4(𝑎 − 𝑐)(54 + 21131𝜃 + 30529𝜃2 + 16941𝜃3 + 4277𝜃4 + 414𝜃5)𝜃(311129 + 443822𝜃 + 243553𝜃2 + 60996𝜃3 + 5876𝜃4) , 
𝑠1𝐶 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(84381 + 120800𝜃 + 68317𝜃2 + 18030𝜃3 + 1856𝜃4)311129 + 443822𝜃 + 243553𝜃2 + 60996𝜃3 + 5876𝜃4 .                      (18) 
It shows that 𝑠𝑖𝐶 > 0, 𝜕𝑠1𝐶𝜕𝜃 > 0 and 𝜕𝑠0𝐶𝜕𝜃 ><0 if 𝜃 ><0.408.  
Then, we obtain certain comparisons from the equilibrium outcomes. 
Lemma 6. 𝑥0𝐶 < 𝑥1𝐶 for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1); 𝑞0𝐶 > 𝑞1𝐶 for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1). 
Contrary to the non-committed case, the public firm invests less but produces more than the private firm, 
irrespective of the degree of privatization.  
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Proposition 6. 𝑠0𝐶 > 𝑠1𝐶  for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1). 
It states that the government grants a higher subsidy to the public firm under the committed 
discriminatory subsidy policy. Thus, when the government commits output subsides before firms decide 
R&D investments, it grants a higher output subsidy to the semi-public firm to increase the total output 
in the market. This is contrary to the finding in the non-committed case.  
Proposition 7. 𝑠0𝐷 >< 𝑠0𝐶  if 𝜃 ><0.165 and 𝑠1𝐷 > 𝑠1𝐶  for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1). 
It states that the government grants a higher (less) output subsidy to the public firm if the degree of 
privatization is high (low), while that of the private firm is higher for any degree of privatization. That 
is, the strategic incentive of overinvestment by the private firm can be reduced by the committed output 
subsidy, while that of the semi-public firm depends on the decision of mixed ownership. If the degree 
of privatization is high, the profit-incentive increases and thus, the government will reduce the output 
subsidy of the semi-public firm. However, if the degree of privatization is sufficiently low, the profit 
incentive decreases and the government will increase the output subsidy of the semi-public firm to 
increase cost efficiency. 
Finally, we obtain the profit of the private firm and welfare in the equilibrium as follows: 
𝜋1𝐶 = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)2(103 + 2𝜃(38 + 7𝜃))(8067 + 𝜃(8548 + 𝜃(3231 + 434𝜃)))2(311129 + 𝜃(443822 + 𝜃(243553 + 52𝜃(1173 + 113𝜃))))2 , 
𝑊𝐶 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)2(177683 + 253550𝜃 + 139047𝜃2 + 34776𝜃3 + 3344𝜃4)2(311129 + 443822𝜃 + 243553𝜃2 + 60996𝜃3 + 5876𝜃4) .      (19)  
It shows that 
𝜕𝜋1𝐶𝜕𝜃 > 0 while 𝜕𝑊𝐶𝜕𝜃 ><0 if 𝜃 <> 0.366. The optimal mixed ownership is 𝜃𝐶 = 0.366, which 
is higher than that under the non-committed case, that is, 𝜃𝐷 = 0.153 < 𝜃𝐶 = 0.366 < 𝜃𝑁 = 0.933. 
Hence, the partial privatization policy is optimal under the committed output subsidy policy. Further, 
we compare the welfare with that under the non-committed case. Then, it simply shows that 
Max{𝑊𝑁 ,𝑊𝐷} < 𝑊𝐶 for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1] and 𝑊𝐷(𝜃𝐷) < 𝑊𝑁(𝜃𝑁) < 𝑊𝐶(𝜃𝐶). 
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Proposition 8. Mixed ownership with partial privatization policy is optimal under the committed output 
subsidy policy and yields the highest welfare. 
It reveals that the committed discriminatory output subsidy policy always yields the highest welfare for 
society, irrespective of the degree of privatization. This is because commitment can eliminate the 
strategic incentive of the firms to invest more in R&D after observing the output subsidy policy, and 
thus, reduces the welfare loss. This sharply contrasts the result of the findings in the non-committed 
subsidy case. 
6. Conclusion  
We considered R&D competition in a mixed duopoly market with a semi-public firm under 
discriminatory output subsidies in a time-consistent regulatory framework and examined the strategic 
incentive of innovation among firms. We highlighted the effect of an output subsidy policy on the 
innovation strategies of the firms, especially the impact of mixed ownership in a semi-public firm on 
cost-reduction innovation. We showed that the government grants a higher subsidy to the private firm 
than the public firm, which yields that the private firm invests more in R&D and produces more output, 
regardless of the degree of privatization. We also showed that the optimal subsidy rates for both firms 
are higher (lower) than the uniform subsidy rate for a sufficiently high (low) degree of privatization, 
which results in a decrease (increase) of social welfare. Finally, we compared the committed 
discriminatory output subsidy policy according to which our findings under the non-committed case 
sharply contrast those of the committed case in which the PNT holds, irrespective of the degree of 
privatization. 
Some directions for future research remains. First, theoretical limitations are largely due to model-
specific assumptions on the demand and cost functions. Second, different market structures such as 
Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg competition with the role of product differentiation should be 
examined to ensure robustness of the findings. Fourth, distinct characteristics of R&D decisions, such 
as R&D spillovers and joint R&D ventures should be also incorporated for further analysis. Finally, 
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understanding the effects of endogenous entry in an oligopolistic market and foreign penetration can be 
promising topics for future research. 
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Appendix: The Proofs 
A 1. Proof of lemma 5 
(i) 𝑥0𝐷 − 𝑥0𝑁 = 4(𝑎−𝑐)𝜃(3519+1098𝜃+20267𝜃2+4200𝜃3+33220𝜃4+5952𝜃5+14624𝜃6+640𝜃7)(74−9𝜃)(2664+351𝜃+17529𝜃2+1052𝜃3+38252𝜃4−224𝜃5+27776𝜃6−1792𝜃7) > 0 for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1).      𝑥1𝐷 − 𝑥1𝑁 = 4(𝑎−𝑐)𝜃(−459+𝜃(12366+𝜃(−2775+4𝜃(12330+𝜃(−2965+16𝜃(803−2𝜃(119−6𝜃)))))))(−74+9𝜃)(−2664+𝜃(−351+𝜃(−17529+4𝜃(−263+𝜃(−9563+56𝜃(1−4𝜃(31−2𝜃)))))))   
Figure 1. 𝑥1𝐷 − 𝑥1𝑁 
 
      𝑋𝐷 > 𝑋𝑁 = 16(𝑎−𝑐)𝜃(765+3366𝜃+4373𝜃2+13380𝜃3+5340𝜃4+14336𝜃5−152𝜃6+352𝜃7)(74−9𝜃)(2664+351𝜃+17529𝜃2+1052𝜃3+38252𝜃4−224𝜃5+27776𝜃6−1792𝜃7) > 0 for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1). 
(ii) 𝑞0𝐷 − 𝑞0𝑁 = 4(𝑎−𝑐)𝜃(489−1470𝜃+5929𝜃2−4190𝜃3+13922𝜃4−2120𝜃5+8320𝜃6)(74−9𝜃)(2664+351𝜃+17529𝜃2+1052𝜃3+38252𝜃4−224𝜃5+27776𝜃6−1792𝜃7) > 0 for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1).       𝑞1𝐷 − 𝑞1𝑁 = 8𝜃(−306+2916𝜃−1868𝜃2+10539𝜃3−5377𝜃4+9816𝜃5−5600𝜃6+320𝜃7)(74−9𝜃)(2664+351𝜃+17529𝜃2+1052𝜃3+38252𝜃4−224𝜃5+27776𝜃6−1792𝜃7)  
Figure 2. 𝑞1𝐷 − 𝑞1𝑁 
 









𝑄𝐷 − 𝑄𝑁 = 4𝜃(−123+4362𝜃+2193𝜃2+16888𝜃3+3168𝜃4+17512𝜃5−2880𝜃6+640𝜃7)(74−9𝜃)(2664+351𝜃+17529𝜃2+1052𝜃3+38252𝜃4−224𝜃5+27776𝜃6−1792𝜃7)  
Figure 3. 𝑄𝐷 − 𝑄𝑁 
 
(iii) 𝜋1𝐷 − 𝜋1𝑁 = { 
 8(𝑎−𝑐)2𝜃(−56247696+153661860𝜃−713018997𝜃2+1540286847𝜃3−3939725871𝜃4+6189922937𝜃5−12116293520𝜃6+12739905720𝜃7−21692704400𝜃8+14229001088𝜃9−21284977536𝜃10+8386478080𝜃11−8993130496𝜃12+2186256384𝜃13−176619520𝜃14+4587520𝜃15) } 
 
(74−9𝜃)2(2664+351𝜃+17529𝜃2+1052𝜃3+38252𝜃4−224𝜃5+27776𝜃6−1792𝜃7)2 < 0  for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1). 
A 2. Proof of lemma 6 
From some necessary calculations, we can obtain the following equilibrium outcomes. 
𝑥0𝐶 = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)(22142 + 𝜃(33747 + 𝜃(19592 + 𝜃(5129 + 510𝜃))))311129 + 𝜃(443822 + 𝜃(243553 + 52𝜃(1173 + 113𝜃))) , 
𝑥1𝐶 = 2(𝑎 − 𝑐)(3 + 𝜃)(8067 + 𝜃(8548 + 𝜃(3231 + 434𝜃)))311129 + 𝜃(443822 + 𝜃(243553 + 52𝜃(1173 + 113𝜃))), 
𝑞0𝐶 = 4(𝑎 − 𝑐)(22241 + 𝜃(31715 + 𝜃(17355 + 𝜃(4325 + 414𝜃))))311129 + 𝜃(443822 + 𝜃(243553 + 52𝜃(1173 + 113𝜃))) , 
𝑞1𝐶 = (𝑎 − 𝑐)(11 + 4𝜃)(8067 + 𝜃(8548 + 𝜃(3231 + 434𝜃)))311129 + 𝜃(443822 + 𝜃(243553 + 52𝜃(1173 + 113𝜃))). 
Then, using the comparisons, we can show that 𝑥0𝐶 − 𝑥1𝐶 < 0 for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1); 𝑞0𝐶 − 𝑞1𝐶 > 0 for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1). 
A 3. Proof of proposition 4 
i) 𝑠0𝐷 − 𝑠𝑞𝑁 = 4(𝑎−𝑐)(−2664+813𝜃−7686𝜃2+10237𝜃3−6398𝜃4+21242𝜃5−2984𝜃6+8320𝜃7)(74−9𝜃)(2664+351𝜃+17529𝜃2+1052𝜃3+38252𝜃4−224𝜃5+27776𝜃6−1792𝜃7)  
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ii) 𝑠1𝐷 − 𝑠𝑞𝑁 = 8(𝑎−𝑐)𝜃(−750+4746𝜃−3120𝜃2+15401𝜃3−8617𝜃4+12508𝜃5−10624𝜃6+896𝜃7)(74−9𝜃)(2664+351𝜃+17529𝜃2+1052𝜃3+38252𝜃4−224𝜃5+27776𝜃6−1792𝜃7)   
Figure 4. 𝑠0𝐷 − 𝑠𝑞𝑁 and 𝑠1𝐷 − 𝑠𝑞𝑁 
 
A 4. Proof of proposition 5 
𝑊𝐷 −𝑊𝑁 = { 
 8(𝑎−𝑐)2𝜃(7336656−222360201𝜃+82856520𝜃2−2170762938𝜃3+575205120𝜃4−8664521629𝜃5+2257209472𝜃6−17909243336𝜃7+4666856160𝜃8−19808166416𝜃9+4716875904𝜃10−10635702592𝜃11+1855867392𝜃12−1926658048𝜃13+83369984𝜃14+6602752𝜃15) } 
 
(74−9𝜃)2(2664+351𝜃+17529𝜃2+1052𝜃3+38252𝜃4−224𝜃5+27776𝜃6−1792𝜃7)2   
Figure 5. 𝑊𝐷 −𝑊𝑁 
 
A 5. Proof of proposition 6 
It is easy to see that 𝑠0𝐶𝐷 − 𝑠1𝐶𝐷 = 216+143𝜃+1316𝜃2−553𝜃3−922𝜃4−200𝜃5311129𝜃+443822𝜃2+243553𝜃3+60996𝜃4+5876𝜃5 > 0 for  𝜃 ∈ [0,1). 
A 6. Proof of proposition 7 
i) 𝑠0𝐷 − 𝑠0𝐶 = 4(𝑎−𝑐)(−3996−7563𝜃+150143𝜃2+238892𝜃3+140951𝜃4+37237𝜃5+3726𝜃6)𝜃(74−9𝜃)(311129+443822𝜃+243553𝜃2+60996𝜃3+5876𝜃4)   
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Figure 6. 𝑠0𝐷 − 𝑠0𝐶𝐷 
 
ii) 𝑠1𝐷 − 𝑠1𝐶 = (𝑎−𝑐)(−1222902−1227441𝜃−101726𝜃2+229675𝜃3+78034𝜃4+6800𝜃5)(−74+9𝜃)(311129+443822𝜃+243553𝜃2+60996𝜃3+5876𝜃4) > 0 for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1). 
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